Posts tagged ‘machine learning’

Is Writing Style Sufficient to Deanonymize Material Posted Online?

I have a new paper appearing at IEEE S&P with Hristo Paskov, Neil Gong, John Bethencourt, Emil Stefanov, Richard Shin and Dawn Song on Internet-scale authorship identification based on stylometry, i.e., analysis of writing style. Stylometric identification exploits the fact that we all have a ‘fingerprint’ based on our stylistic choices and idiosyncrasies with the written word. To quote from my previous post speculating on the possibility of Internet-scale authorship identification:

Consider two words that are nearly interchangeable, say ‘since’ and ‘because’. Different people use the two words in a differing proportion. By comparing the relative frequency of the two words, you get a little bit of information about a person, typically under 1 bit. But by putting together enough of these ‘markers’, you can construct a profile.

The basic idea that people have distinctive writing styles is very well-known and well-understood, and there is an extremely long line of research on this topic. This research began in modern form in the early 1960s when statisticians Mosteller and Wallace determined the authorship of the disputed Federalist papers, and were featured in TIME magazine. It is never easy to make a significant contribution in a heavily studied area. No surprise, then, that my initial blog post was written about three years ago, and the Stanford-Berkeley collaboration began in earnest over two years ago.

Impact. So what exactly did we achieve? Our research has dramatically increased the number of authors that can be distinguished using writing-style analysis: from about 300 to 100,000. More importantly, the accuracy of our algorithms drops off gently as the number of authors increases, so we can be confident that they will continue to perform well as we scale the problem even further. Our work is therefore the first time that stylometry has been shown to have to have serious implications for online anonymity.[1]

Anonymity and free speech have been intertwined throughout history. For example, anonymous discourse was essential to the debates that gave birth to the United States Constitution. Yet a right to anonymity is meaningless if an anonymous author’s identity can be unmasked by adversaries. While there have been many attempts to legally force service providers and other intermediaries to reveal the identity of anonymous users, courts have generally upheld the right to anonymity. But what if authors can be identified based on nothing but a comparison of the content they publish to other web content they have previously authored?

Experiments. Our experimental methodology is set up to directly address this question. Our primary data source was the ICWSM 2009 Spinn3r Blog Dataset, a large collection of blog posts made available to researchers by Spinn3r.com, a provider of blog-related commercial data feeds. To test the identifiability of an author, we remove a random k (typically 3) posts from the corresponding blog and treat it as if those posts are anonymous, and apply our algorithm to try to determine which blog it came from. In these experiments, the labeled (identified) and unlabled (anonymous) texts are drawn from the same context. We call this post-to-blog matching.

In some applications of stylometric authorship recognition, the context for the identified and anonymous text might be the same. This was the case in the famous study of the federalist papers — each author hid his name from some of his papers, but wrote about the same topic. In the blogging scenario, an author might decide to selectively distribute a few particularly sensitive posts anonymously through a different channel.  But in other cases, the unlabeled text might be political speech, whereas the only available labeled text by the same author might be a cooking blog, i.e., the labeled and unlabeled text might come from different contexts. Context encompasses much more than topic: the tone might be formal or informal; the author might be in a different mental state (e.g., more emotional) in one context versus the other, etc.

We feel that it is crucial for authorship recognition techniques to be validated in a cross-context setting. Previous work has fallen short in this regard because of the difficulty of finding a suitable dataset. We were able to obtain about 2,000 pairs (and a few triples, etc.) of blogs, each pair written by the same author, by looking at a dataset of 3.5 million Google profiles and searching for users who listed more than one blog in the ‘websites’ field.[2] We are thankful to Daniele Perito for sharing this dataset. We added these blogs to the Spinn3r blog dataset to bring the total to 100,000. Using this data, we performed experiments as follows: remove one of a pair of blogs written by the same author, and use it as unlabeled text. The goal is to find the other blog written by the same author. We call this blog-to-blog matching. Note that although the number of blog pairs is only a few thousand, we match each anonymous blog against all 99,999 other blogs.

Results. Our baseline result is that in the post-to-blog experiments, the author was correctly identified 20% of the time. This means that when our algorithm uses three anonymously published blog posts to rank the possible authors in descending order of probability, the top guess is correct 20% of the time.

But it gets better from there. In 35% of cases, the correct author is one of the top 20 guesses. Why does this matter? Because in practice, algorithmic analysis probably won’t be the only step in authorship recognition, and will instead be used to produce a shortlist for further investigation. A manual examination may incorporate several characteristics that the automated analysis does not, such as choice of topic (our algorithms are scrupulously “topic-free”). Location is another signal that can be used: for example, if we were trying to identify the author of the once-anonymous blog Washingtonienne we’d know that she almost certainly resides in or around Washington, D.C. Alternately, a powerful adversary such as law enforcement may require Blogger, WordPress, or another popular blog host to reveal the login times of the top suspects, which could be correlated with the timing of posts on the anonymous blog to confirm a match.

We can also improve the accuracy significantly over the baseline of 20% for authors for whom we have more than an average number of labeled or unlabeled blog posts. For example, with 40–50 labeled posts to work with (the average is 20 posts per author), the accuracy goes up to 30–35%.

An important capability is confidence estimation, i.e., modifying the algorithm to also output a score reflecting its degree of confidence in the prediction. We measure the efficacy of confidence estimation via the standard machine-learning metrics of precision and recall. We find that we can improve precision from 20% to over 80% with only a halving of recall. In plain English, what these numbers mean is: the algorithm does not always attempt to identify an author, but when it does, it finds the right author 80% of the time. Overall, it identifies 10% (half of 20%) of authors correctly, i.e., 10,000 out of the 100,000 authors in our dataset. Strong as these numbers are, it is important to keep in mind that in a real-life deanonymization attack on a specific target, it is likely that confidence can be greatly improved through methods discussed above — topic, manual inspection, etc.

We confirmed that our techniques work in a cross-context setting (i.e., blog-to-blog experiments), although the accuracy is lower (~12%). Confidence estimation works really well in this setting as well and boosts accuracy to over 50% with a halving of recall. Finally, we also manually verified that in cross-context matching we find pairs of blogs that are hard for humans to match based on topic or writing style; we describe three such pairs in an appendix to the paper. For detailed graphs as well as a variety of other experimental results, see the paper.

We see our results as establishing early lower bounds on the efficacy of large-scale stylometric authorship recognition. Having cracked the scale barrier, we expect accuracy improvements to come easier in the future. In particular, we report experiments in the paper showing that a combination of two very different classifiers works better than either, but there is a lot more mileage to squeeze from this approach, given that ensembles of classifiers are known to work well for most machine-learning problems. Also, there is much work to be done in terms of analyzing which aspects of writing style are preserved across contexts, and using this understanding to improve accuracy in that setting.

Techniques. Now let’s look in more detail at the techniques I’ve hinted at above. The author identification task proceeds in two steps: feature extraction and classification. In the feature extraction stage, we reduce each blog post to a sequence of about 1,200 numerical features (a “feature vector”) that acts as a fingerprint. These features fall into various lexical and grammatical categories. Two example features: the frequency of uppercase words, the number of words that occur exactly once in the text. While we mostly used the same set of features that the authors of the Writeprints paper did, we also came up with a new set of features that involved analyzing the grammatical parse trees of sentences.

An important component of feature extraction is to ensure that our analysis was purely stylistic. We do this in two ways: first, we preprocess the blog posts to filter out signatures, markup, or anything that might not be directly entered by a human. Second, we restrict our features to those that bear little resemblance to the topic of discussion. In particular, our word-based features are limited to stylistic “function words” that we list in an appendix to the paper.

In the classification stage, we algorithmically “learn” a characterization of each author (from the set of feature vectors corresponding to the posts written by that author). Given a set of feature vectors from an unknown author, we use the learned characterizations to decide which author it most likely corresponds to. For example, viewing each feature vector as a point in a high-dimensional space, the learning algorithm might try to find a “hyperplane” that separates the points corresponding to one author from those of every other author, and the decision algorithm might determine, given a set of hyperplanes corresponding to each known author, which hyperplane best separates the unknown author from the rest.

We made several innovations that allowed us to achieve the accuracy levels that we did. First, contrary to some previous authors who hypothesized that only relatively straightforward “lazy” classifiers work for this type of problem, we were able to avoid various pitfalls and use more high-powered machinery. Second, we developed new techniques for confidence estimation, including a measure very similar to “eccentricity” used in the Netflix paper. Third, we developed techniques to improve the performance (speed) of our classifiers, detailed in the paper. This is a research contribution by itself, but it also enabled us to rapidly iterate the development of our algorithms and optimize them.

In an earlier article, I noted that we don’t yet have as rigorous an understanding of deanonymization algorithms as we would like. I see this paper as a significant step in that direction. In my series on fingerprinting, I pointed out that in numerous domains, researchers have considered classification/deanonymization problems with tens of classes, with implications for forensics and security-enhancing applications, but that to explore the privacy-infringing/surveillance applications the methods need to be tweaked to be able to deal with a much larger number of classes. Our work shows how to do that, and we believe that insights from our paper will be generally applicable to numerous problems in the privacy space.

Concluding thoughts. We’ve thrown open the doors for the study of writing-style based deanonymization that can be carried out on an Internet-wide scale, and our research demonstrates that the threat is already real. We believe that our techniques are valuable by themselves as well.

The good news for authors who would like to protect themselves against deanonymization, it appears that manually changing one’s style is enough to throw off these attacks. Developing fully automated methods to hide traces of one’s writing style remains a challenge. For now, few people are aware of the existence of these attacks and defenses; all the sensitive text that has already been anonymously written is also at risk of deanonymization.

[1] A team from Israel have studied authorship recognition with 10,000 authors. While this is interesting and impressive work, and bears some similarities with ours, they do not restrict themselves to stylistic analysis, and therefore the method is comparatively limited in scope. Incidentally, they have been in the news recently for some related work.

[2] Although the fraction of users who listed even a single blog in their Google profile was small, there were more than 2,000 users who listed multiple. We did not use the full number that was available.

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February 20, 2012 at 9:40 am 7 comments

Data-mining Contests and the Deanonymization Dilemma: a Two-stage Process Could Be the Way Out

Anonymization, once the silver bullet of privacy protection in consumer databases, has been shown to be fundamentally inadequate by the work of many computer scientists including myself. One of the best defenses is to control the distribution of the data: strong acceptable-use agreements including prohibition of deanonymization and limits on data retention.

These measures work well when outsourcing data to another company or a small set of entities. But what about scientific research and data mining contests involving personal data? Prizes are big and only getting bigger, and by their very nature involve wide data dissemination. Are legal restrictions meaningful or enforceable in this context?

I believe that having participants sign and fax a data-use agreement is much better from the privacy perspective than being able to download the data with a couple of clicks. However, I am sympathetic to the argument that I hear from contest organizers that every extra step will result a big drop-off in the participation rate. Basic human psychology suggests that instant gratification is crucial.

That is a dilemma. But the more I think about it, the more I’m starting to feel that a two-step process could be a way to get the best of both worlds. Here’s how it would work.

For the first stage, the current minimally intrusive process is retained, but the contestants don’t get to download the full data. Instead, there are two possibilities.

  • Release data on only a subset of users, minimizing the quantitative risk. [1]
  • Release a synthetic dataset created to mimic the characteristics of the real data. [2]

For the second stage, there are various possibilities, not mutually exclusive:

  • Require contestants to sign a data-use agreement.
  • Restrict the contest to a shortlist of best performers from the first stage.
  • Switch to an “online computation model” where participants upload code to the server (or make database queries over the network) and obtain results, rather than download data.

Overstock.com recently announced a contest that conformed to this structure—a synthetic data release followed by a semi-final and a final round in which selected contestants upload code to be evaluated against data. The reason for this structure appears to be partly privacy and partly the fact that are trying to improve the performance of their live system, and performance needs to be judged in terms of impact on real users.

In the long run, I really hope that an online model will take root. The privacy benefits are significant: high-tech machinery like differential privacy works better in this setting. But even if such techniques are not employed, although there is the theoretical possibility of contestants extracting all the data by issuing malicious queries, the fact that queries are logged and might be audited should serve as a strong deterrent against such mischief.

The advantages of the online model go beyond privacy. For example, I served on the Heritage Health Prize advisory board, and we discussed mandating a limit on the amount of computation that contestants were allowed. The motivation was to rule out algorithms that needed so much hardware firepower that they couldn’t be deployed in practice, but the stipulation had to be rejected as unenforceable. In an online model, enforcement would not be a problem. Another potential benefit is the possibility of collaboration between contestants at the code level, almost like an open-source project.

[1] Obtaining informed consent from the subset whose data is made publicly available would essentially eliminate the privacy risk, but the caveat is the possibility of selection bias.

[2] Creating a synthetic dataset from a real one without leaking individual data points and at the same time retaining the essential characteristics of the data is a serious technical challenge, and whether or not it is feasible will depend on the nature of the specific dataset.

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June 14, 2011 at 6:54 pm Leave a comment

Link Prediction by De-anonymization: How We Won the Kaggle Social Network Challenge

The title of this post is also the title of a new paper of mine with Elaine Shi and Ben Rubinstein. You can grab a PDF or a web-friendly HTML version generated using my Project Luther software.

A brief de-anonymization history. As early as the first version of my Netflix de-anonymization paper with Vitaly Shmatikov back in 2006, a colleague suggested that de-anonymization can in fact be used to game machine-learning contests—by simply “looking up” the attributes of de-anonymized users instead of predicting them. We off-handedly threw in paragraph in our paper discussing this possibility, and a New Scientist writer seized on it as an angle for her article.[1] Nothing came of it, of course; we had no interest in gaming the Netflix Prize.

During the years 2007-2009, Shmatikov and I worked on de-anonymizing social networks. The paper that resulted (PDF, HTML) showed how to take two graphs representing social networks and map the nodes to each other based on the graph structure alone—no usernames, no nothing. As you might imagine, this was a phenomenally harder technical challenge than our Netflix work. (Backstrom, Dwork and Kleinberg had previously published a paper on social network de-anonymization; the crucial difference was that we showed how to put two social network graphs together rather than search for a small piece of graph-structured auxiliary information in a large graph.)

The context for these two papers is that data mining on social networks—whether online social networks, telephone call networks, or any type of network of links between individuals—can be very lucrative. Social networking websites would benefit from outsourcing “anonymized” graphs to advertisers and such; we showed that the privacy guarantees are questionable-to-nonexistent since the anonymization can be reversed. No major social network has gone down this path (as far as I know), quite possibly in part because of the two papers, although smaller players often fly under the radar.

The Kaggle contest. Kaggle is a platform for machine learning competitions. They ran the IJCNN social network challenge to promote research on link prediction. The contest dataset was created by crawling an online social network—which was later revealed to be Flickr—and partitioning the obtained edge set into a large training set and a smaller test set of edges augmented with an equal number of fake edges. The challenge was to predict which edges were real and which were fake. Node identities in the released data were obfuscated.

There are many, many anonymized databases out there; I come across a new one every other week. I pick de-anonymization projects if it will advance the art significantly (yes, de-anonymization is still partly an art), or if it is fun. The Kaggle contest was a bit of both, and so when my collaborators invited me to join them, it was too juicy to pass up.

The Kaggle contest is actually much more suitable to game through de-anonymization than the Netflix Prize would have been. As we explain in the paper:

One factor that greatly affects both [the privacy risk and the risk of gaming]—in opposite directions—is whether the underlying data is already publicly available. If it is, then there is likely no privacy risk; however, it furnishes a ready source of high-quality data to game the contest.

The first step was to do our own crawl of Flickr; this turned out to be relatively easy. The two graphs (the Kaggle graph and our Flickr crawl), were 95% similar, as we were later able to determine. The difference is primarily due to Flickr users adding and deleting contacts between Kaggle’s crawl and ours. Armed with the auxiliary data, we set about the task of matching up the two graphs based on the structure. To clarify: our goal was to map the nodes in the Kaggle training and test dataset to real Flickr nodes. That would allow us to simply look  up the pairs of nodes in the test set in the Flickr graph to see whether or not the edge exists.

De-anonymization. Our effort validated the broad strategy in my paper with Shmatikov, which consists of two steps: “seed finding” and “propagation.” In the former step we somehow de-anonymize a small number of nodes; in the latter step we use these as “anchors” to propagate the de-anonymization to more and more nodes. In this step the algorithm feeds on its own output.

Let me first describe propagation because it is simpler.[2] As the algorithm progresses, it maintains a (partial) mapping between the nodes in the true Flickr graph and the Kaggle graph. We iteratively try to extend the mapping as  follows: pick an arbitrary as-yet-unmapped node in the Kaggle graph, find the “most similar” node in the Flickr graph, and if they are “sufficiently similar,” they get mapped to each other.

Similarity between a Kaggle node and a Flickr node is defined as cosine similarity between the already-mapped neighbors of the Kaggle node and the already-mapped neighbors of the Flickr node (nodes mapped to each other are treated as identical for the purpose of cosine comparison).

In the diagram, the blue  nodes have already been mapped. The similarity between A and B is 2 / (√3·√3) =  ⅔. Whether or not edges exist between A and A’ or B and B’ is irrelevant.

There are many heuristics that go into the “sufficiently similar” criterion, which are described in our paper. Due to the high percentage of common edges between the graphs, we were able to use a relatively pure form of the propagation algorithm; the one my paper with Shmatikov, in contast, was filled with lots more messy heuristics.

Those elusive seeds. Seed identification was far more challenging. In the earlier paper, we didn’t do seed identification on real graphs; we only showed it possible under certain models for error in auxiliary information. We used a “pattern-search” technique, as did the Backstrom et al paper uses a similar approach. It wasn’t clear whether this method would work, for reasons I won’t go into.

So we developed a new technique based on “combinatorial optimization.” At a high level, this means that instead of finding seeds one by one, we try to find them all at once! The first step is to find a set of k (we used k=20) nodes in the Kaggle graph and k nodes in our Flickr graph that are likely to correspond to each other (in some order); the next step is to find this correspondence.

The latter step is the hard one, and basically involves solving an NP-hard problem of finding a permutation that minimizes a certain weighting function. During the contest I basically stared at this page of numbers for a couple of hours, and then wrote down the mapping, which to my great relief turned out to be correct! But later we were able to show how to solve it in an automated and scalable fashion using simulated annealing, a well-known technique to approximately solve NP-hard problems for small enough problem sizes. This method is one of the main research contributions in our paper.

After carrying out seed identification, and then propagation, we had de-anonymized about 65% of the edges in the contest test set and the accuracy was about 95%. The main reason we didn’t succeed on the other third of the edges was that one or both the nodes had a very small number of contacts/friends, resulting in too little information to de-anonymize. Our task was far from over: combining de-anonymization with regular link prediction also involved nontrivial research insights, for which I will again refer you to the relevant section of the paper.

Lessons. The main question that our work raises is where this leaves us with respect to future machine-learning contests. One necessary step that would help a lot is to amend contest rules to prohibit de-anonymization and to require source code submission for human verification, but as we explain in the paper:

The loophole in this approach is the possibility of overfitting. While source-code verification would undoubtedly catch a contestant who achieved their results using de-anonymization alone, the more realistic threat is that of de-anonymization being used to bridge a small gap. In this scenario, a machine learning algorithm would be trained on the test set, the correct results having been obtained via de-anonymization. Since successful [machine learning] solutions are composites of numerous algorithms, and consequently have a huge number of parameters, it should be possible to conceal a significant amount of overfitting in this manner.

As with the privacy question, there are no easy answers. It has been over a decade since Latanya Sweeney’s work provided the first dramatic demonstration of the privacy problems with data anonymization; we still aren’t close to fixing things. I foresee a rocky road ahead for machine-learning contests as well. I expect I will have more to say about this topic on this blog; stay tuned.

[1] Amusingly, it was a whole year after that before anyone paid any attention to the privacy claims in that paper.

[2] The description is from my post on the Kaggle forum which also contains a few additional details.

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March 9, 2011 at 12:30 pm 4 comments

The Unsung Success of CAN-SPAM

In today’s debate around Do Not Track, detractors frequently make a comparison to the CAN-SPAM Act and how it failed to stop spam. Indeed, in 2010 an average of 183 billion spam emails were sent per day, so clearly the law was thoroughly ineffective.

Or was it?

Decrying the effect of CAN-SPAM by looking at the total number, or even the percentage, of spam emails betrays a lack of understanding of what the Act was intended to do and how laws operate in general. Clearly, the Act does nothing to deter spammers in Ukraine or China; it’s not like the legislators were oblivious to this. To understand the positive effects that CAN-SPAM has had, it is necessary to go back to 2003 and see why spam filters weren’t working very well back then.

Typically thousands of dimensions are used, but only three are shown here

To a first approximation, a spam filter, like all machine learning-based “classifiers,” works by representing an email as a point in a multi-dimensional space and looking at which side of a surface (such as a “hyperplane”) it falls on. The hyperplane is “learned” by looking at already-classified emails. When you click the “report spam” button, you’re “training” this classifier, and it tweaks the hyperplane to become slightly more accurate in the future.

For emails that look obviously like spam, the classifier will never make a mistake, no matter how many millions of them it sees. The emails that it has trouble with are those that have some properties of ham and some properties of spam — those close to the boundary.

It is difficult for spammers to make their emails look legitimate, because ultimately they need to sell you a penis-enlargement product or whatever other scam they’re peddling. Back in the good old days when spam filters were hand-coded, they’d use tricks like replacing the word Viagra with Vi@gra. But the magic of machine learning ensures that modern filters will automatically update themselves very quickly.

Ham that looks like spam is much more of a problem. E-mail marketing is a grey area, and marketers will do anything they can to entice you to open their messages. Why honestly title your email “October widget industry newsletter” when you can instead title it “You gotta check this out!!”  Compounding this problem is the fact that people get much more upset by false positives (legitimate messages getting lost) than false negatives (spam getting through to inbox).

It now becomes obvious how CAN-SPAM made honest people honest (and the bad guys easier to prosecute) and how that changed the game. The rules basically say, “don’t lie.” If you look a corpus of email today, you’ll find that the spectrum that used to exist is gone — there’s obviously legitimate e-mail (that intends to comply) and obviously illegitimate e-mail (that doesn’t care). The blue dots in the picture have been forced to migrate up — or risk being in violation. As you can imagine, spam filters have a field day in this type of situation.

And I can prove it. Instead of looking at how much spam is sent, let’s look at how much spam is getting through. Obviously this is harder to measure, but there is a simple proxy: search volume. The logic is straightforward: people who have a spam problem will search for it, in the hope of doing something about it.

Note: data is not available before 2004

A-ha! A five-fold decrease since CAN-SPAM was passed. That doesn’t prove that the decrease is necessarily due to the Act, but it does prove that those who claim spam is still a major problem have no clue what they’re talking about.

There’s unsolicited email that is legitimate under CAN-SPAM; most people would consider these to be spam as well. Here’s where another provision of the Act comes in: one-click unsubscribe. Michael Dayah reports on an experiment showing that for this type of spam, unsubscription is almost completely effective.

Incidentally, his view of CAN-SPAM concurs with mine:

The CAN-SPAM act then strongly bifurcated spammers. Some came into the light and followed the rules, using relevant subjects, no open relays, understandable language, and an unsubscribe link that supposedly functioned. Other went underground, doing their best to skirt the content filtering with nonsense text and day-old Chinese landing domains.

I would go so far as to say that the Act is a good model for the interplay between law and technology in solving a difficult problem. I’m not sure to what extent the lawmakers anticipated the developments that followed its passage, but CAN-SPAM is completely undeserving of the negative, even derisive reputation that it has acquired.

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December 20, 2010 at 5:37 pm 4 comments


About 33bits.org

I'm an assistant professor of computer science at Princeton. I research (and teach) information privacy and security, and moonlight in technology policy.

This is a blog about my research on breaking data anonymization, and more broadly about information privacy, law and policy.

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